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15	UNITED STATES DI	STRICT COURT
16	NORTHERN DISTRIC	Γ OF CALIFORNIA
17	SAN JOSE D	IVISION
18	ASUS COMPUTER INTERNATIONAL; and )	Case No.: 15-cv-1716 (BLF)
19	ASUSTEK COMPUTER INCORPORATED )	DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF
20	Plaintiffs, )	MOTION AND MOTION TO EXCLUDE OPINIONS AND
21	v. )	TESTIMONY OF: 1. APOSTOLOS K. "PAUL"
22	INTERDIGITAL, INC.; INTERDIGITAL ) COMMUNICATIONS, INC.;	KAKAES; 2. FIONA M. SCOTT MORTON;
23	INTERDIGITAL TECHNOLOGY (CORPORATION; IPR LICENSING, INC.; and (CORPORATION)	AND 3. GREGORY K. LEONARD
24	INTERDIGITAL PATENT HOLDINGS, INC., )	Hearing date: February 14, 2019
25	Defendants. )	Time: 9:00 a.m. Judge: Hon. Beth Labson Freeman
26	<u> </u>	
27	PUBL	IC
28	REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUM	IENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED

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### **Table of Abbreviations**

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InterDigital	Defendants InterDigital, Inc., InterDigital Communications, Inc., InterDigital Technology Corporation, IPR Licensing, Inc., and InterDigital Patent Holdings, Inc.
ASUS	Plaintiffs ASUS Computer International and Asustek Computer Incorporated
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute, a standards development organization
FRAND	Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory
SEP	Standards Essential Patent
UE	User Equipment (e.g., mobile devices like cellular phones)
2G	Second Generation (of cellular technology)
3G	Third Generation (of cellular technology)
4G	Fourth Generation (of cellular technology)

Exhibits cited as "Ex. \_\_\_" are exhibits to the Declaration of Matthew R. Reed, filed concurrently herewith.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 14, 2019 at 9:00 am in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Courtroom 3, 280 South First Street, San Jose, InterDigital shall and hereby does move for an order excluding certain opinions and testimony of ASUS experts Apostolos K. "Paul" Kakaes, Fiona M. Scott Morton and Gregory K. Leonard.

Issue to be decided: Whether certain opinions and testimony of ASUS's experts meet the standards set by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court in *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).<sup>1</sup>

#### I. INTRODUCTION

InterDigital respectfully requests that this Court exercise its gatekeeping authority as outlined in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and *Daubert* to exclude certain opinions and testimony of three of ASUS's experts: (1) Apostolos K. "Paul" Kakaes; (2) Fiona M. Scott Morton; and (3) Gregory K. Leonard. District courts rightfully exclude an expert's opinions where, among other things, the expert: has not done his or her own analysis (or even supervised the analysis), but instead parrots the opinions of others; proffers opinions that lack sufficient basis to be reliable; makes conclusory and unsupported extrapolations from a small, non-representative sample; or offers legal opinions under the guise of expert opinions, seeking to testify as to ultimate issues in the case.

<u>Dr. Kakaes</u> offers flawed opinions on two topics which should be stricken:	
For the first topic, Dr. Kakaes did not perform any of the essentiality analysis himself,	
and did not even supervise a large portion of it.	
Further, the proffered analysis is unreliable because it is not repeatable;	
A	nd

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Attached as Exhibits 1-5 are versions of the expert reports that are the subject of this motion, with blue and green highlights indicating the portions of the reports that InterDigital requests be excluded.

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1	Dr. Kakaes failed to provide the basis and reasons for the conclusions
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1	Dr. Scott Morton offers improper opinions reflecting her legal conclusions relating to
12	ASUS's antitrust and breach of contract claims against InterDigital. Specifically, she opines
13	(1)
14	(2) that InterDigital has violated the "fair" and "reasonable" components of InterDigital's
15	commitments to the European Telecommunications Standardization Institute ("ETSI") regarding
16	licensing standards essential patents ("SEPs") on FRAND terms and conditions; (3) that
17	InterDigital has discriminated against ASUS in violation of its FRAND commitments to ETSI;
18	(4) that ASUS is a "willing licensee"; (5) that InterDigital has acquired monopoly power in the
19	Cellular Technology Markets; (6) that InterDigital's conduct has caused anticompetitive harm to
20	ASUS and consumers; and (7)
21	subject matters, which concern legal opinions and ultimate issues for the jury to resolve, are
22	solely within the province of the Court, are not the proper subject of expert testimony, and should
23	be excluded under Rule 702.
24	Dr. Leonard similarly offers improper legal opinions and conclusions concerning
25	InterDigital's compliance with FRAND obligations.
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27	
28	This proposed testimony
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should be excluded, as it goes to ultimate issues for the jury and thus invades the province of the Court.

#### II. APPLICABLE LAW

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Before an expert may testify before a jury, the district court must act as a "gatekeeper" and screen the expert's testimony under the standards set by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court's decision in *Daubert*. To be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, an expert's opinion testimony must be "based on sufficient facts or data," and be "the product of reliable principles and methods," and the expert must have "reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 16-md-02741-VC, 2018 WL 3368534, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2018) (citation omitted). There are two key questions "at the heart of the admissibility determination: whether the testimony is relevant and whether it is reliable." Id.; In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 318 F. Supp. 2d 879, 890 (C.D. Cal. 2004). "The focus of the reliability inquiry is on the principles and methodology an expert uses in forming his opinions rather than the expert's conclusions." In re Roundup, 2018 WL 3368534, at \*5. The goal here is to "prevent[] shoddy expert testimony and junk science from reaching the jury." BladeRoom Grp. Ltd. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:15-cv-01370-EJD, 2018 WL 1611835, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2018) (citation omitted). The Court must also consider whether, for a given conclusion, "there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). "[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the *ipse dixit* of the expert." *Id.* "In short, both unsound methods and unjustified extrapolations from existing data can require the Court to exclude an expert." *In re Roundup*, 2018 WL 3368534, at \*5.

While "Rule 703 permits . . . hearsay, or other inadmissible evidence, upon which an expert properly relies, to be admitted to explain the basis of the expert's opinion," "[i]t does not allow the admission of the reports to establish the truth of what they assert." *Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc.*, 745 F.2d 1254, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1984). In other words, "[a]n expert may not serve 'simply as a conduit for introducing hearsay under the guise that the testifying expert used

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the hearsay as the basis of his testimony." *United States v. Shafi*, No. 15-cr-00582-WHO-1, 2018 WL 3159769, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2018) (quoting *Owens v. Republic of Sudan*, 864 F.3d 751, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, "an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law. Similarly, instructing the jury as to the applicable law is the distinct and exclusive province of the court." *Nationwide Trans. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc.*, 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Hangartner v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co.*, 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004); *see also Mannick v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.*, No. C 03-5905, 2006 WL 1626909, at \*17 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2006) (an expert's testimony may not "interpret[] the law for the court or . . . advis[e] the court about how the law should apply to the facts of a particular case"). Such expert testimony "usurps either the role of the trial judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role of the jury in applying that law to the facts before it," *Nimely v. City of N.Y.*, 414 F.3d 381, 397 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted), and "by definition does not aid the jury in making a decision; rather, it undertakes to tell the jury what result to reach, and thus attempts to substitute the expert's judgment for the jury's." *In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig.*, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1362-63 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2017), *aff'd*, 714 F. App'x 986 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

While Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides that "[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue," the Ninth Circuit has made clear that testimony that "merely tells the jury what result to reach is not sufficiently helpful to the trier of fact to be admissible." *Nationwide Trans. Fin.*, 523 F.3d at 1060; *see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.*, No. C10-1823, 2013 WL 4008822, at \*12 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 2013) ("Where the jury is in as good a position as the expert to draw conclusions from the evidence, and is capable of drawing its own inferences, the expert's ultimate issue testimony is not helpful and should be excluded.").

Moreover, expert testimony consisting of legal conclusions regarding "the parties'

[F]RAND obligations and duties is solely within the province of the court." *Microsoft*, 2013 WL

1	4008822, at *20; see also Aguilar v. Int'l Longshoremen's Union Local No. 10, 966 F.2d 443,
2	447 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding district court's determination that expert testimony relating to
3	contract interpretation would be "utterly unhelpful" and inadmissible).
4	III. THE COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE DR. KAKAES' FLAWED OPINIONS
5	ASUS accuses InterDigital of offering licenses to its SEPs that do not comply with
6	InterDigital's FRAND commitments. To establish what it believes a FRAND offer from
7	InterDigital should be, ASUS advances
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11	See Ex. 4 ¶¶ 206-215.
12	In support of this approach, ASUS economic expert Dr. Leonard relies on
13	
14	Ex. 4 ¶ 63 and Table 2. However, Dr. Kakaes' opinions regarding
15	as well as his opinions regarding
16	should be excluded.
17	A. Dr. Kakaes Offers Fatally Flawed Opinions on Two Topics
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20	is a company
21	based in India that provides consulting services, including patent review services.
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
# DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE OPINIONS AND TESTIMONY OF:

APOSTOLOS K. "PAUL" KAKAES; FIONA M. SCOTT MORTON; AND GREGORY K. LEONARD

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Dr. Kakaes' opinions related to

are inadmissible because:

(1) (2) methodology is not


reproducible; and (3) the basis and reasons for and Dr. Kakaes' analyses have not been
provided. Each of these problems alone provides a basis to exclude Dr. Kakaes' opinions; taken
together, they more than warrant exclusion. *Cf. In re Roundup*, 2018 WL 3368534, at \*31
(excluding expert's opinion where each problem was insufficient on its own to justify exclusion
but, in combination, "the problems . . . le[d] the Court to conclude that his opinion is not
sufficiently reliable to be admissible.").

a) Dr. Kakaes did not perform the
analysis and did not supervise much of work.

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4	Because an expert must "apply his knowledge to the facts and form his own opinion,"
5	Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corp., No. 08-cv-0068-WS-B., 2010 WL 779283, at *4 (S.D.
6	Ala. Mar. 2, 2010) (emphasis added), this is improper. In effect, Dr. Kakaes is merely serving as
7	a "mouthpiece" for with respect to Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA,
8	LLC, 281 F.R.D. 534, 547 (C.D. Cal. 2012), leaving the Court no opportunity to review the
9	methodology or the reliability of work. <sup>4</sup> Karum Holdings LLC v. Lowe's Cos., No. 15 C
10	380, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192269, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2017) (excluding expert
11	testimony on a damages model where the model was not built or supervised by the expert).
12	ASUS cannot argue that results can be attributed to Dr. Kakaes because
13	
14	
15	Ex. 1 ¶¶ 180-190. However, Dr. Kakaes did not
16	keep a record of the patents he reviewed, nor did he set forth anywhere the results of his own
17	analysis of He should not be allowed to rely upon judgment rather
18	than setting forth his own. Abrams, 2010 WL 779283, at *4; Cholakyan, 281 F.R.D. at 546.
19	Further, ASUS cannot argue that opinions can be attributed to Dr. Kakaes
20	because
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26	<sup>4</sup> Indeed, ASUS did not proffer the reviewers as experts: ASUS did not disclose the reviewers as expert witnesses who would testify at trial (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A)) and
<ul><li>27</li><li>28</li></ul>	did not provide expert reports from them (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)). ASUS did not establish that the reviewers are sufficiently qualified in the relevant fields to act as experts.
	_9-

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3	Dr. Kakaes improperly seeks to serve as a
4	"mouthpiece" for those experts, shielding them from cross-examination or critical analysis.
5	Cholakyan, 281 F.R.D. at 547; Eveler v. Ford Motor Co., No. 16-14776, 2017 WL 3382460, at *9
6	(E.D. La. Aug. 7, 2017); K&N Eng'g, Inc. v. Spectre Performance, No. EDCV 09-1900VAP
7	(DTBx), 2011 WL 13131157, at *10 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2011).
8	The numbers Dr. Kakaes presents in his report purporting to set forth
9	—are likewise not his own.
10	
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15	Again, Dr. Kakaes is improperly serving
16	as the "mouthpiece" of others. Cholakyan, 281 F.R.D. at 547.
17	b) essentiality analysis is un-reproducible.
18	The lack of reproducibility of the essentiality analysis is an independent ground to exclude
19	Dr. Kakaes' opinions. The opinions
20	are inconsistent from one case to another. These inconsistent
21	results are an indicator of unreliability. See United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1098 (9th
22	Cir. 2002) ("Inconsistent results may be an indicator of unreliability") (citing <i>Daubert</i> , 509 U.S.
23	at 590 n.9)).
24	The reviewers at previously conducted a patent census and performed an
25	essentiality analysis for a different case, TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd., et al. v.
26	Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, et al., Case No. 8:14-cv-00341 (C.D. Cal.).
27	That work was partly supervised by
28	Dr. Kakaes and partly by another expert, Dr. Ding. Ex. 9 ¶ 312.
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1	opinions should be excluded. See Lawrence v. Raymond Corp., No. 09-cv-1067, 2011 U.S. Dist.
2	LEXIS 85798, at *20 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2011), aff'd, 501 F. App'x 515 (6th Cir. 2012).8
3	2. Dr. Kakaes' Opinions Regarding
4	Lack Basis and Are Unreliable
5	In his second set of opinions, Dr. Kakaes opines
6	Like his first set of opinions, these
7	opinions lack reliability and are without basis.
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13	Dr. Kakaes does not, however, establish that
14	these patents are representative of InterDigital's portfolio of likely essential patents.
15	Dr. Kakaes' failure to include any statistical analysis or any explanation of how it was
16	statistically meaningful to extrapolate an opinion from his review of
17	makes his opinions about InterDigital's patents unreliable. See
18	Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming exclusion of expert's
19	reliance on a study where, among other things, the "district court concluded that the study
20	was unreliable because it did not include any statistical analysis and did not explain whether it
21	was statistically meaningful to extrapolate from such a small sample size").
22	In addition, because Dr. Kakaes did not look at similar data points (e.g., litigation history,
23	claim charts, or patent contributions) for any other patent owners to compare them against
24	
25	<sup>8</sup> While an expert may rely on hearsay evidence, an expert may not be a conduit for
26	inadmissible hearsay. <i>Shafi</i> , 2018 WL 3159769, at *5. "Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted." <i>United States v. Johnson</i> , 875 F.3d 1265, 1278 (9th Cir. 2017).
27	hearsay because they are being proffered to prove and do not fall under any of the hearsay exceptions.
28	and do not fair under any of the hearsay exceptions.

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1	InterDigital's, his conclusion lacks any foundation
2	Ipse dixit conclusions can create "too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
3	proffered." See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
4	
5	Without reviewing the litigation history of other patent owners who have asserted likely
6	essential patents, no conclusion can be made as to the relative quality of InterDigital's previously
7	litigated patents in comparison to other patent owners. Similarly, without performing any
8	analysis of other patent owner's patents discussed in licensing negotiations, he cannot draw any
9	conclusion as to the relative "quality" of InterDigital's patents. Finally, without performing any
10	analysis of other patent owner's contributions to standard setting organizations, he likewise
11	cannot draw any conclusion about InterDigital's relative contributions. Dr. Kakaes has done
12	nothing to support or substantiate his
13	Dr. Kakaes' "[p]ersonal opinion, not science, is testifying here." Daubert v.
14	Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Turpin v. Merrell Dow
15	Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992)).
16	This is not the first time Dr. Kakaes has proffered one-sided and incomplete comparisons.
17	In TCL v. Ericsson, the court found that Dr. Kakaes' opinions regarding the importance and
18	contribution of Ericsson's proportional share of likely essential patents were not helpful because
19	TCL's expert—Dr. Kakaes—had not reviewed any other patent owner's likely essential patents
20	and had not considered whether anyone else owned the alleged alternative that he asserted could
21	have been adopted into the standard. Ex. 10 at 41-42 (TCL v. Ericsson, Slip op., Case No. 8:14-
22	cv-00341 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018)). The district court in TCL also found Dr. Kakaes'
23	discussion of Ericsson's patent contributions lacking because he had not analyzed "whether
24	alternatives are mutually inconsistent with each other, would perform worse than the standard,
25	would even create a viable, functional standard, or require other patents owned by Ericsson (thus
26	defeating the point of the analysis)." <i>Id.</i> at 41. This is the case here as well. Dr. Kakaes has not
27	considered InterDigital's contributions in the proper context.
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2	Thus, he repeated the same
3	errors as he committed in TCL.
4 5	IV. THE COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE DR. SCOTT MORTON'S IMPROPER LEGAL OPINIONS
6	In support of its breach of contract claims, ASUS alleges that
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8	Additionally,
9	ASUS claims that InterDigital has unlawfully used its alleged monopoly power in the "Cellular
10	Markets" to cause harm to ASUS and to competition in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
11	Act. See id. ¶¶ 13-14; FAC ¶¶ 72-85.
12	ASUS retained Dr. Scott Morton to provide expert opinions concerning, among other
13	things: (1) (2) whether InterDigital has violated
14	the "fair" and "reasonable" components of InterDigital's FRAND commitments to ETSI;
15	(3) whether InterDigital has discriminated against ASUS in violation of its FRAND
16	commitments to ETSI; (4) whether ASUS is a "willing licensee"; (5) whether InterDigital has
17	acquired monopoly power in the Cellular Technology Markets; (6) whether InterDigital's
18	conduct has caused anticompetitive harm to ASUS and to consumers; and (7)
19	See Ex. 2 ¶¶ 16-17. With respect to each of these
20	subject areas, Dr. Scott Morton offers improper legal conclusions that warrant exclusion under
21	Rule 702.
22	A. Dr. Scott Morton's Legal Conclusions Regarding ASUS's Breach of Contract
23	Claims Should Be Excluded
24	ASUS claims that InterDigital has violated its ETSI FRAND obligations with respect to
25	the 2008 PLA and subsequent licensing offers made to ASUS. Specifically, ASUS alleges that
26	InterDigital has imposed and demanded "supra-competitive royalties" that are not FRAND. See
27	FAC ¶¶ 50, 97, 105. Dr. Scott Morton offered two expert reports that set out her views on these
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1	questions. As discussed below, certain aspects of Dr. Scott Morton's proposed testimony are
2	inadmissible under Rule 702.
3	First, Dr. Scott Morton's opinions regarding
4	should be
5	excluded as improper legal conclusions. See Microsoft, 2013 WL 4008822, at *14 (expert
6	witnesses "must be prohibited from opining on the interpretation of the RAND obligation vis-à-
7	vis the rights and obligations of the SEP holder and implementer"). Here, Dr. Scott Morton
8	opines
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13	Because "there is little question that statements by an
14	expert witness as to the circumstances under which a patent holder fulfills its RAND obligation
15	is beyond the scope of permissible expert testimony," <i>Microsoft</i> , 2013 WL 4008822, at *14,
16	these opinions should be excluded.
17	Second, Dr. Scott Morton further concludes that InterDigital has violated the "fair" and
18	"reasonable" components of its ETSI FRAND commitments. Specifically,
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20	Such testimony is improper,
21	as opinions concerning whether InterDigital has complied with its FRAND commitments
22	constitute legal conclusions. See Microsoft, 2013 WL 4008822, at *15 (excluding testimony
23	regarding whether Motorola met its RAND obligations because it "assumes the law and the
24	parties' obligations or touches on what the law should be"). Moreover, these opinions should be
25	excluded because they address ultimate issues. Because the jury is capable of determining
26	whether the 2008 PLA and InterDigital's offers were "fair" and "reasonable," Dr. Scott Morton's
27	proposed testimony which purports to make that determination would not be helpful to the jury.
28	See id. at *12.

1	Third,
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4	Like her proposed testimony concerning whether InterDigital violated the fair and reasonable
5	components of its FRAND obligations, Dr. Scott Morton's legal conclusion that the terms in the
6	2008 PLA and subsequent offers from InterDigital are discriminatory goes to an ultimate issue in
7	the case, would not be helpful to the jury, and should be excluded.
8	Fourth, in support of ASUS's affirmative claim that it is a "willing licensee," Dr. Scott
9	Morton opines that ASUS
10	Whether ASUS has been
11	a "willing licensee" during the course of its license negotiations with InterDigital presents
12	another ultimate issue. Because,
13	, determining whether ASUS
14	has behaved as a willing licensee is intertwined with its FRAND-related claims. It is
15	inappropriate for an expert to offer a legal conclusion on this ultimate issue, which the jury is
16	capable of deciding; it is the role of the jury to evaluate the evidence concerning ASUS's
17	negotiating conduct and conclude whether it is a willing licensee with respect to InterDigital's
18	SEPs.
19 20	B. Dr. Scott Morton's Legal Conclusions Regarding ASUS's Sherman Act Clain Should Be Excluded
21	In support of its claim that InterDigital's conduct violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
22	ASUS argues that InterDigital has acquired and maintained monopoly power in the Cellular
23	Technology Markets, abused that alleged monopoly power, and caused harm to ASUS and to
24	competition as a result. See FAC ¶¶ 72-85. In addition to offering improper legal conclusions
25	on these very issues, Dr. Scott Morton also advances the highly inappropriate opinion that
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27	Dr. Scott Morton's legal opinions concerning InterDigital's alleged acquisition,
28	maintenance, and abuse of monopoly power in the Cellular Technology Markets are improper, as

1	such opinions comprise legal conclusions regarding elements of a Sherman Act claim and thus
2	usurp the role of the jury. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 114, 174. Throughout her reports, Dr. Scott Morton
3	additionally offers conclusory legal opinions concerning specific alleged conduct by InterDigital,
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6	Such statements also relate to ultimate issues for the jury, and
7	should be excluded here.
8	Similarly, Dr. Scott Morton's legal conclusions concerning whether InterDigital's alleged
9	conduct caused anticompetitive harm to ASUS and to consumers constitute improper expert
10	testimony. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 25, 238. In particular, her proposed testimony on whether
11	InterDigital's alleged conduct caused any injury (to ASUS or competition generally) lacks
12	foundation and usurps the role of the jury, as it concerns a factual question on an ultimate issue.
13	See In re W. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973) ("the problems of damages
14	and causation are questions of fact for the jury"); Pac. Shores Props., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. City of
15	Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1168 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Causation is an intensely factual question
16	that should typically be resolved by a jury").
17	Finally, Dr. Scott Morton's legal conclusion that
18	is especially improper and should be
19	excluded. Id. ¶ 26. See Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., Case 5:16-cv-00923-BLF, Dkt.
20	334 at 9 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018) (excluding expert opinions concerning "whether antitrust laws
21	should prohibit specific conduct").
22 23	V. THE COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE DR. LEONARD'S IMPROPER LEGAL OPINIONS
24	Like Dr. Scott Morton, Dr. Leonard offers improper legal opinions that are inadmissible
25	under Rule 702. Throughout his Opening Report, Dr. Leonard opines on
26	See Microsoft, 2013 WL 4008822, at *14
27	(prohibiting expert testimony relating to "the interpretation of the RAND obligation"). For
28	example, Dr. Leonard opines that a
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3	Such opinions regarding what comprises FRAND terms and conditions
4	are improper because they purport to explain how the law should be applied, an inappropriate
5	subject for expert testimony.
6	Indeed, in Microsoft Corporation v. Motorola, Inc., the district court granted a motion to
7	exclude similar testimony offered by Dr. Leonard. See Microsoft, 2013 WL 4008822, at *22
8	(finding Dr. Leonard's testimony regarding what RAND requires of SEP owners to be
9	inadmissible legal conclusions). The court went on to explain that "through its jury instructions,"
10	the court would "determine[] the rights and obligations of the parties under the RAND
11	commitment," and that "Dr. Leonard or any other witness must be prohibited from opining on
12	the interpretation of the RAND obligation vis-à-vis the rights and obligations of the SEP holder
13	and implementer." Id.
14	Additionally,
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20	These legal
21	conclusions, under the guise of economic expert opinions, should similarly be excluded.
22	Dr. Leonard also attempts to apply his version of the law to the facts of the case, offering
23	specific legal conclusions regarding InterDigital's alleged conduct. In both his Opening Report
24	and Second Supplemental Report, Dr. Leonard concludes that
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3	These legal conclusions should also be excluded.
4	Finally, Dr. Leonard offers the legal conclusion that
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8	These legal
9	conclusions not only lack foundation, they also constitute inadmissible expert testimony and
10	should be excluded.
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